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After the Bubble: The Survival and 
Ownership of Internet Marketplaces 
for Farmers and Agribusiness 
W. Parker Wheatley and  Brian L. Buhr 
This paper presents a theory of  how industry structure and beliefs about Internet 
marketplace use have driven choice and ownership of  marketplaces. The theory's 
predictions suggest that surviving Internet marketplaces will be those with strong 
historical  linkages in an industry and those owned by  or affiliated with major 
commodity buyers. Comparisons of these predictions with actual outcomes provide 
validation of the  theory. Where predictions differ from results, observations are  made 
as to the nature of  the deviations. 
Key  words:  agricultural markets, electronic commerce, Internet markets, network 
externalities, technology adoption 
Introduction 
Internet commerce contributes to the continuing search for new or different marketplaces 
for agricultural products, improved business processes, and less costly transactions. 
Despite this growing phenomenon, little attention has been paid by the agricultural 
economics literature to the fundamental economic issues of who owns Internet market- 
places and how this affects the success of an Internet marketplace. The issue of market- 
place ownership in agriculture is particularly important as traditional marketplaces 
continue to consolidate and raise the prospect of increased exercise of market power. 
The great exuberance of  firms to set up online marketplaces in the late 1990s was 
soon tempered by post-Internet bubble economic realities. Prior to 2002, some Internet 
marketplaces began operations, obtained financing, and went out of  existence or were 
acquired through merger in less than a year. Many firms which began business as 
places for exchange and negotiated trading moved toward being service and software 
providers for individuals or groups of businesses seeking to buy or sell commodities via 
the Internet. In examining these processes, this paper reviews the literature on market 
formation, sponsorship,' and choice. Based on the theory of market formation, a game 
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'  We treat sponsorship and ownership as  synonymous. Sponsorship allows a slightly broader interpretation including, 
for example, an exclusive agreement to conduct all transactions in a particular marketplace even with no ownership stake. 
However, the intent is the notion that a firm is somehow committed to tradingin a particular marketplace and other firms 
are aware of this; ownership is the clearest signal of the intent to trade. FVheatley and Buhr  After the Bubble  503 
theoretic approach is used to analyze the potential for alternative ownership structures 
of Internet markets given the existing structure (size, number, and volume of firms and 
transactions) of agricultural industries. 
Review of the Literature on 
Marketplace Formation 
In the early 1980s, there were broad discussions of  the effects of electronic marketing 
on agricultural industries (Henderson, 1984; Purcell, 1984; Russell, 1984; Schrader, 
1984; Sporleder, 1984).  The rise of the Internet again brought attention to the question 
of  how electronic markets would affect agricultural markets (Chambers et al., 2001; 
Schiefer, Helbig, and Rickert, 2001). In addition to cataloging Internet initiatives, the 
more recent work arrives at a broad set of  questions about the effects of  information 
technologies on agricultural markets. 
However, discussing the impacts of Internet markets presupposes their formation and 
successful implementation. As noted by Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl(1991, p. 593), 
"Markets arise only after extensive interaction between entrepreneurial experimenta- 
tion, contract development, and legal review that results in a complex apparatus in 
which to conduct trade." Research suggests that the process of marketplace choice and 
sponsorship incorporates the following: (a)  the theory of network externalities and its 
relationship to market liquidity and market choice, (b)  the  role of ownership and pricing 
in marketplace formation, and (c) the importance of  beliefs and expectations about 
adoption of an Internet marketplace by buyers and sellers. 
Network Externalities, Liquidity, and  Market Choice 
For an Internet marketplace to succeed, it must attract adequate liquidity. Multiple 
definitions for liquidity exist (Lippman and McCall, 1986; Economides and Siow, 1988), 
but it is sufficient to characterize liquidity of Internet marketplaces as the feature that 
makes it possible to readily buy or sell a product. From a buyer's perspective, a market- 
place is less liquid if there is little prospect of the participation of sellers, and vice versa 
for the case of  the seller. Related to the concept of  liquidity is the idea of  a network 
externality. Economides (1996) remarks that the components of  the exchange trans- 
action, the "offer" and "counteroffer," are complementary, with each having no value 
without the other, and hence resemble a network externality effect. The literature on 
network externalities, technology, and financial markets tends to support the argument 
for the formation of single marketplaces which build on positive network externalities 
that would be lost if markets fragmented CDi  Noia, 2001; Domowitz, 1995; Economides, 
1996; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993; Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 
1986; Pagano, 1989). 
These varied methodologies support the  conclusion that  positive network externalities 
of  increased liquidity and buyer and seller participation will frequently, although not 
always, lead to consolidation of  Internet marketplaces. The theories developed in this 
literature also emphasize the importance of the cost of services in a given marketplace 
in the decision to use it. Therefore, the success of a single Internet market will depend 
on its ability to provide liquidity by attracting large and similar numbers of buyers and 
sellers and through having competitive fees for users. 504  December 200.5  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The Role of  Sponsorship or Ownership 
Several studies have recognized that if liquidity and pricing are two key components to 
market success, then those who are buyers or sellers might find a natural advantage in 
sponsoring a marketplace. Ownership and participation provide assurance that liquidity 
will be present (Dai and Kauffman, 2003; Lucking-Reilly  and Spulber, 2001). The nexus 
of ownership and pricing for use of marketplaces has been discussed in the literature by 
Di Noia (2001) as well as Hart and Moore (1996). These studies note there may be a 
natural tension between profit maximization of  the exchange mechanism itself and 
increasing the liquidity of the market. Despite this conflict and other arguments against 
participant-owned marketplaces, the history of futures exchanges reveals the common 
occurrence  of  mutual  ownership  by  buyers  and  sellers  of  commodities, thereby 
supporting the notion that sponsorship has historically played a role in marketplace 
formation and success (Baer and Saxon, 1949). 
The Role of  Beliefs 
Most prior research focuses heavily on a static concept of  market choice and does not 
attempt to model the role of beliefs in market choice (Di Noia, 2001; Economides, 1996; 
Ellison and Fudenberg, 2002; Ellison, Fudenberg, and Mobius, 2004). However, those 
studies do raise the issue of the potential effects of expectations about the equilibrium 
size of  competing markets on  market choice. In a practical  setting, this arises in 
Domowitz's (1995) argument that beliefs about the persistence of  floor trading have 
slowed the adoption of electronic trading in domestic and European markets. 
Other researchers have considered how expectations about adoption of  competing 
technologies are fulfilled and how lock-in, critical mass, and historical events affect 
network technology adoption. Arthur (1989)  presents a theoretical model which supports 
Domowitz's logic that historical factors leading to the adoption of  one technology can 
lock agents into using the technology despite its potential inferiority. Using a similar 
methodology, Witt  (1997) argues that lock-in  cannot be a permanent phenomenon 
because many innovations eventually gain preeminence by obtaining a critical mass of 
adoption and ultimately gaining the network advantage. In the context of  modeling 
technology adoption, Witt finds adoption depends heavily on the probabilistic nature of 
adoption (i.e., prior beliefs) and the initial conditions (i.e., historical factors). Further- 
more, he asserts that one must incorporate preexisting technologies, or in the case of the 
Internet, trading platforms, in order to more appropriately capture the salient features 
of the real world. Witt also shows that if a large company sponsors a major innovation, 
it may have greater incentives to support technological diffusion. Such sponsorship 
would allow a technology or Internet marketplace to attract the attention of potential 
users and thereby affect users' beliefs about whether such Internet marketplaces will 
attract adequate liquidity. 
Issues of  this entrenchment or lock-in of marketplaces are also connected with the 
embeddedness concept in the management literature. In the logic of  Gnyawali and 
Madhavan  (2001), one could  note that the structure of  inter-firm relationships in 
agriculture (structural embeddedness) and the social connections between players in 
commodity markets (relational embeddedness) hypothetically work in tandem to limit 
the ability of buyers and sellers to deviate from current networks of trading despite the Wheatley and Buhr  After the Bubble  505 
potential enhancements to competition of  Internet marketplaces. One might make a 
further connection to the tensions in the Witt (1997) and Arthur (1989) lock-in argu- 
ments on this point. Specifically, Dacin, Ventresca, and Beal's (1999)  work supports the 
argument that given the potential complexity and degree to which current trading 
relationships are embedded, significant changes and broadening in markets will be 
required in order to "disembed" local networks and trading relationships, and thereby 
supplant them with Internet marketplaces. 
Conceptual and Game Theoretic Approach 
to Marketplace Adoption and Formation 
The literature reviewed above is summarized as a decision process for marketplace 
formation in figure 1. Marketplace choice in agriculture will be modeled to depend on 
factors of network externality effects, costs and prices of using the markets, ownership 
of  markets, and the beliefs of participants. Business process (e.g., guaranteeing pay- 
ments, product quality, and managing logistics as part of the arms-length transaction) 
is important to the question of marketplace adoption and success. However, business 
process issues can be subsumed into transactions cost efficiency, an operational issue, 
in which case economic theory clearly leads to a least-cost selection criterion. Other 
factors described in the literature review, and which are the focus of this research, are 
conjectural on the part of participants and subject to game theoretic analysis. 
Conceptual Model of  Network Externalities 
of  Marketplace Choice 
In a basic structure and environment of trading, agents trade a single commodity q for 
a pricep,. For the cotton business, this commodity would be pounds of cotton, for grains 
it  would be bushels, and for livestock it  would be per hundredweight (cwt) of cattle, and 
so on. There are B buyers who use q as an intermediate input for producing product y 
which sells for p,  and which is taken as exogenous to the model. Buyers are differen- 
tiated into two types by their holding of  a fmed resource A, where B, and B, are the 
components of B representing the middle (m)  and high (h)  types of buyers. The nomen- 
clature "average" and "large" sized buyers and sellers is used interchangeably with 
"middle" and "kigh" sized buyers and sellers. Largehigh type buyers and sellers are 
simply the group of  largest buyers and sellers, and averagelmiddle type buyers and 
sellers represent the average of  all other buyers and sellers. Allowing for two types of 
buyers and sellers introduces heterogeneity of types of farms and processors while not 
overcomplicating the analysis. This differentiation  of  buyers by  a fmed resource  is 
analogous to the differentiation of  agents in Pagano's (1989) model by  their initial 
endowments. In general, the heterogeneity could be applied to risk preferences, wealth 
differences, or any other number of differentiating factors. Buyers combine their inter- 
mediate good (q)  with their fmed resource (A) into a final output (y)  through a standard 
technology. 
On the seller side of the market, there are S sellers who produce q as their final out- 
put. As with the buyers, sellers are differentiated by their holding of a fmed resource L, 
where S,  and S, are the component members of  S classified as the middle and high 
types of  sellers. For example, sellers are generally constrained by land (in the case of 506  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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Figure 1. Market structure, use expectations, and  the choice 
and  formation of internet marketplaces 
grain and other crop producers), and growing, finishing, laying, feedlot facilities in the 
cases of cattle,  poultry, and swine. Sellers' technology is characterized by a standard cost 
function. As with buyers, the different holdings of the fured resource will yield different 
output supplies by these differentiated producers. 
In terms of creating a tradable strategic environment, it is assumed that either all 
or none of the buyers or sellers of a particular type participate in a market. In a context 
where a particular group of  consumers is considering the purchase of  a network tech- 
nology, Katz and Shapiro (1986) assume these consumers coordinate their decisions to 
choose the technology that is Pareto preferred by the group. This assumption effectively 
reduces the analysis of  thousands of  agents' behaviors into a  situation with  four 
strategic agents in our case. Specifically, we have high buyers (B,), medium buyers (B,), 
high sellers (S,),  and medium sellers (S,) with groups of buyers and sellers acting as a 
single entity. In the parlance of  Ellison and Fudenberg (2002), the limitation of  this 
assumption is that there will be a larger "market impact" effect from the entry or exit 
of a group of buyers from a market, for example, as opposed to the small impact of entry 
or exit by one buyer. 
In order to consider payoff variations due to player entry and exit, we make a further 
simplifying assumption that  buyers and sellers choose a level of quantity demanded and 
supplied based on their estimates of the quantities demanded and supplied by all other 
buyers and sellers. An ex ante fured level of quantity demanded or supplied by any given 
agent prior to marketplace choice is consistent with the commonly used unit demand1 
supply assumptions of  Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986);  DiNoia (2001); and Ellison and Wheatley and Buhr  After the Bubble  507 
Table 1. Industry Structures, Defined by the Feasible Intersections of 




Fudenberg (2002). Given the optimal quantities demanded and supplied under these 
conditions, we allow agents to choose the marketplace in which they will trade when 
faced with a choice of two or three possible marketplaces. 
Industry structure is characterized by the number and quantity produced by different 
types of buyers and sellers. The numbers of high buyers, medium buyers, high sellers, 
and medium sellers are denoted B,,  B,,  S,,  and S,,  respectively. The corresponding 
input demands and output supplies of these buyers and sellers are denoted qih,  qim,  qjh, 
and qj,.  Industry structure then is based on the relative sizes of  quantities demanded 
and supplied by the different types of buyers and sellers. For example, Bhqih  is simply 
a representation of  the total quantity demanded by  high buyers, with similar inter- 
pretations holding for B,q,,  Shqjh,  and S,qj,.  Again, other factors could be used such 
as risk aversion, but size is easily quantifiable and readily observable. Given the earlier 
assumption on output supply and input demand determination, the following aggregate 
condition must hold (i.e., no excess demand for the market as a whole): 
With the market-clearing condition in mind, we first split industries based simply on 
the  relationships between high buyers and medium buyers as  well as  between high sellers 
and medium sellers. Second, industries are split based on subconditions  derived from the 
relative sizes of buyer quantities demanded to seller quantity supplied. Table 1  summar- 
izes the  eight feasible industry structures for this study, where the  industry structures are 
defined by the feasible intersections of conditions (columns) with subconditions (rows). 508  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Given a particular industry structure, one can derive the payoff orderings from each 
possible configuration of  buyers or sellers participating in a given marketplace. In 
notational terms, we compare IIi,(Bh,  S,) with IIih(Bh,  S,, B,,  S,),  where the first expres- 
sion represents the payoffs to high buyers when only buying from high sellers, and the 
second expression corresponds to the payoffs to high buyers when the market includes 
all types of  buyers and sellers. With this prefatory remark, table 2 shows the payoff 
orderings for each buyer and seller type under each industry structure. These payoff 
orderings form the core of the strategic environment of marketplace choice. [The proofs 
andlor assumptions required for the orderings are available from the authors upon 
request and may also be found in Wheatley (2004).] 
Ownership, Marketplace Pricing, and User Costs 
Given the above description of  payoffs, we now incorporate fees and user costs for 
Internet marketplaces. In order to trade in the traditional marketplace, there is a linear 
transaction cost (t)  per unit of  output traded at the market. This cost might be attrib- 
uted to search and effort expended in trading in traditional marketplaces. This aspect 
represents the final component needed to consider firm behavior, profits, and market 
equilibrium for a commodity exhibiting heterogeneity of buyers and sellers. 
In the event an Internet marketplace is formed, buyers and sellers face a new trans- 
action cost of exchange. This new cost is denoted as tMm.  Evidence suggests these trans- 
action costs should be lower than those of  traditional markets (Garicano and Kaplan, 
2001). This information can then be incorporated into payoffs to allow for post-Internet 
payoff comparisons between different types of  marketplaces. For purposes of  clarity, 
aside from the traditional pre-Internet marketplace CTM), we posit that four basic types 
of  marketplace ownership patterns are possible: (a) high-buyer (HB) owned market- 
places, (b) high-seller (HS) owned marketplaces, (c) high-buyerhigh-seller (JO) owned 
marketplaces, and (d)  third-party (TP)  marketplaces. This constraint is plausible in the 
sense that medium-buyer and medium-seller owned marketplaces may find it prohibi- 
tively expensive to organize. 
To support such Internet ventures, firms must charge users some price, denoted here 
as UC with subscripts TP, HB, HS, and JO  corresponding to the Internet marketplaces 
under different ownerships. For example, UCTp  represents the user cost of a third-party 
marketplace. Finally, the subscript PO is used generically to refer to all participant- 
owned marketplaces. We consider two key scenarios on cost of use: (a)  UCTp  c UCpo, and 
(b) UCTp > UCpo. The total costs of  using any Internet marketplace are also restricted 
to be less than those of  a traditional marketplace (i.e., tMm  and UC,,  < t).  We abstract 
from the topic of price competition as discussed by Caillaud and Jullien (2001,2003). 
Games of Marketplace Choice 
With information on payoffs and user costs, we can address how buyers and sellers react 
when faced with different possible choices of  marketplaces. In this context, there are 
seven basic marketplace choice games, as summarized in table 3. 
The first four games identified in table 3 are simply the standard two-market choice 
environment where agents, excluding participant-owners, decide which marketplace to 
use. The latter three games are slightly more complexin that there are two possible user Wheatley and Buhr  After the Bubble  509 
Table 2. Payoff Relationships Under Each Industry Structure 
Industry Structure 1.1: Concentrated-High Seller Dominant (CHSD) 
~jm(Bh,B,,S,)>~jm(Bh,S,)>IIj,(B,,S,)>II,,(Bh,B,,Sh,Sm)>~jm(Bh,Sh~Sm)>IIj,(B,~Sh~S,) 
IIi,(B,,  Sh,  S,)  > IIim(Bm,  Sh)  > IIi,(Bh,  B,,  Sh,  S,)  > II;,(B,,  S,)  > IIim(Bh,  B,,  Sh)  > IIi,(Bh, B,,  S,) 
IIjh(Bh,  B,,  Sh)  > IIjh(Bh,  B,,  Sh,  S,)  > IIjh(Bh,  Sh)  > Hjh(Bm,  Sh)  > Hjh(Bh,  Sh,  S,)  > Hjh(Bm,  Sh,  S,) 
IIih(Bh,  Sh,  S,)  > IIih(Bh'Sh)  > IIih(Bh,  B,,  Sh,  S,)  > IIih(Bh,  S,)  > IIih(Bh,  B,,  Sh)  > IIih(Bh'  B,,  S,) 
Industry Structure 1.4: Concentrated-High Buyer Dominant (CHBD) 
njm(Bh,  Bm,  S,)  > njm(Bh,  S,)  > njm(Bh,  B,,  Sh,  Sm)  > njm(B,, S,)  > njm(Bh,  Sh,  Sm)  > nj,(B,,  Sh,  S,) 
Dim(Bm,  Sh,  S,)  > IIim(Bm,  Sh)  > II;,(B,,  S,)  > IIi,(Bh, B,,  Sh,  S,)  > IIim(Bh,  B,,  Sh)  > niph,  B,,  S,) 
njh(Bh,  Bm)  Sh)  > njh(Bh,  Sh)  > IIjh(Bh,  B,,  Sh,  Sm)  > njh(Bm,  Sh)  > njh(Bh,  Sh,  Sm)  > njh(Bm9  Sh$  Sm) 
IIih(Bh,  S,, S,)  > IIih(Bh,  B,,  Sh,  S,)  > IIih(Bh,  Sh)  > IIih(Bh,  S,)  > IIih(Bh'  B,,  Sh)  > IIih(Bh,  B,,  S,) 
Industry Structure 2.2: Buyer Concentrated-Medium Seller Dominant (BCMSD) 
nj,(Bh, B,,  S,)  > nj,(Bh, B,,  Sh,  S,)  > njm(Bh,  Sm)  > njm(Bm,  S,)  > njm(Bh Shy Sm)  >  Sh  S,) 
ni,(B,,  Sh,S,) > II;,(B,,S,)  >n;,(Bh,B,,  Sh,  S,)  >n;,(B m, Sh)  >Hi,@  h,  B  m, S,)  >ni,(Bh,B,,  Sh) 
njh(Bh,  B,,  Sh)  > IIjh(Bh,  Sh)  > njh(Bm,  Sh)  > njh(Bh,  Bm,  Shr  S,)  > njh(Bh,  Sh,  Sm)  > njh(Bm'Sh?  Sm) 
nih(Bh,  Sh,  S,)  > nih(Bh,  S,)  > nih(Bh,  Bm,  Shr  Sm)  > nih(Bht  Sh)  > nih(Bh9  Bm7  Sm)  Bm,  Sh) 
Industry Structure 2.4: Buyer Concentrated-High Buyer Dominant (BCHBD) 
~jm(~h,~m,~m)>~jm(~h~~m)>~(~h~~,,~h,~,)>~jm(~,~~m)>~jm(~~~~~r~m)>~(~m~~h~~m) 
IIi,(B,,  S,, S,)  > IIim(Bm,  S,)  > IIim(Bm,  Sh)  > IIim(Bh,  B,,  Sh,  S,)  > IIi,(Bh'  B,,  Sm)  > II,,(Bh,  B,,  Sh) 
IIjh(Bh,  B,,  Sh)  > IIjh(Bh,  Sh)  > njh(Bh,  Bm,  Shy  Sm)  > njh(Bmy  Sh)  > njh(Bh,  Sh' Sm)  >  njh(Bm,  Sm) 
Dih(Bh,  Sh,  S,)  B,,  Sh,  S,)  > nfi(Bh,  S,)  > nih(Bh,  Sh)  > Hih(Bh,  B,,  S,)  > n,(Bj,,  B,,  Sh) 
Industry Structure 3.1: Seller Concentrated-High Seller Dominant (SCHSD) 
II.  jm (B  hy B  m, S  m )>a.  jm (B  m* S  m )>II.  jm  (B  h?  S  m )>~jm(~h,~m,Sh,S,)>~jm(~,,Sh,S,)>~jm(Bh,Sh,S,) 
IIi,(B,,  Sh,  S,)  > Hirn(Bm,  Sh)  > II,,(B,,  B,,  Sh,  S,)  > IIim(Bm,  S,)  > IIi,(Bh,  B,,  Sh)  > n;,(Bh, B,,  S,) 
Djh(Bh,Bm,Sh)  >njh(Bh,BmrSh,Sm)>  njh(BmrSh)>njh(BhlSh)  >~jh(BmlSh,Sm)>njh(Bh,Sh~Sm) 
II,h(Bh,Sh,S,)>II,(Bh,Sh)>~ih(Bh~B,~Sh~Sm)>~;~(B~rSm)>~ih~~h~Bm~S~)>~;~(Bh~BmtSm) 
Industry Structure 3.3: Seller Concentrated-Medium Buyer Dominant (SCMBD) 
njm(Bh  3 Bm  3 sm  > njm(Bm  9 sm  ) > njm(Bh  9 Bm  9 sh  9 sm  > njm(Bh  3 s,,, > njm(Bm,  sh7  s,) > njm(Bh  9 sh  9 s,,, 
~im(~,~~~~~m)>~;,(~~~~,~~~~~m)>~~m(~m~~~)>~im(~m,~m)>~;m(~h,~m,~h)>~i,(~h~~,~~,) 
njh(Bh' Bm  ? Sh) >  njh(Bm  7 Sh) >  njh(Bh  7 Bm,  Sh? Sm) > njh(Bh  r Sh)  > njh(Bm,  Sh,  Sm) >  njh(Bh  3 Sh  9 
nih(Bh,  Sh,  S,)  > nih(Bh,  Sh)  > n,(Bj,,  S,)  >  Bmr  Shr  Sm)  > nih(Bh,  B,,  Sh)  > IIih(Bh,  Bm7  Sm) 
Industry Structure 4.2: Unconcentrated-Medium Seller Dominant (UMSD) 
njm(Bh,  Bm,  Sm)  > njm(Bh,  B,  Sh, S,)  > njm(Bm  S,)  > njm(Bh  Sm)  > nj,(B,,  Sh S,)  > njm(Bhl  Sh,  Sm) 
nim(Bm'Sh,  S,)  >IIi,(B,,  S,)  >  B,,  Sh,  S,)  > IIim(Bm,  Sh)  > IIi,(Bh, B,,  S,)  > II,,(Bh, B,,  Sh) 
njh(Bh,  Bm)  Sh) >njh(Bm9  >njh(Bh?  Sh) >njh(Bh?  Bm?  Sh?  Sm) >njh(Bm,  Sh,  Sm)  >  IIjh(Bh, Sh7  Sm) 
Hih(Bh,  Sh,  S,)  > Hih(Bh,  S,)  > Hih(Bh,  B,,  S,, S,)  > IIih(Bh,  Sh)  > n,(Bh, B,,  S,)  > IIih(Bh,  B,,  Sh) 
Industry Structure 4.3: Unconcentrated-Medium Buyer Dominant (UMBD) 5 10  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Market Choice Games 
cost relationships between the TP and each of the other participant-owned marketplaces 
(i.e, UCTp c UCpo and UCTp > UCpo). With this information, potential investors can 
predict the outcome of  each of the seven marketplace choice games so as to arrive at an 
ex ante assessment of  their possibility to successfully launch an Internet marketplace 
under any industry structure and cost scenario. 
Game  Description 
I  Traditional (TM)  vs. Third-Party (TP) 
I1  Traditional (TM)  vs. High  Buyer (HB) 
I11  Traditional (TM) vs. High  Seller (HS) 
IV  Traditional (TM)  vs. Jointly-Owned (JO) 
Equilibrium Selection and the Role of Beliefs 
in Marketplace Choice 
Game  Description 
V  TM vs. TP  vs. HB 
VI  TM vs. TP  vs. HS 
VII  TM vs. TP  vs. JO 
Because most of  these games exhibit the potential for two or more Nash equilibria, we 
note that previous researchers  have attempted to model expectations (Witt, 1997; Arthur, 
1989; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993) and use these beliefs to select a single equilibrium 
result from among many possible candidates. For purposes of this analysis, we use the 
payoff orderings discussed above, in combination with priors about marketplace choice, 
to select a Nash equilibrium using a procedure developed in Harsanyi (1975) and 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988), and made implementable via computer by  Herings and 
Peeters (2001).  The basic goal of  Harsanyi and Selten was to "offer rational criteria for 
selecting one equilibrium point as the solution of  any non-cooperative game.. .  ."  To that 
end, market participants must establish some prior about the market choice of  other 
market participants. We  use a simple linear weighting system to develop such priors, 
where these priors are based on the following characteristics: (a)  whether the Internet 
marketplace has previous history in electronic  trading, (b)  whether the Internet market- 
place is owned by market participants, and (c) whether one Internet marketplace has 
higher or lower fees. Three different methods of creating priors are used, and are differ- 
entiated by  the weight they place on  the preexistence of  a marketplace in electronic 
form. (The details of the procedures of  aggregation and development of prior beliefs are 
available from the authors upon request.) 
The linear tracing procedure developed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) updates these 
priors until they converge with certainty that each of  the other players will play a 
unique strategy, selecting a single Nash equilibrium in strategies. The procedure uses 
initial beliefs and payoffs to choose a single Nash equilibrium from among the many 
candidate equilibria. 
Marketplace Ownership 
Given the equilibria selected in the above marketplace choice games, potential investors 
(e.g., high buyers, high sellers, and third-party investors) can ascertain the value of 
investing in the setup of  an Internet marketplace. In essence, they engage in a sequen- 
tial game whereby large buyers and sellers decide whether to form a joint marketplace Wheatley and Buhr  After the Bubble  5 1 1 
or to form separate enterprises. Then, the third-party investors can reasonably assess 
the viability of a third-party marketplace. 
For a given commodity, an  outcome with two Internet marketplaces would be described 
as  untenable over the long run due to inefficiency concerns as  well as the likelihood that 
such an outcome would lead to economic loss for all Internet marketplaces. This claim 
is particularly relevant for two cases. First, even if a third-party marketplace attains 
some liquidity and continues to compete with a participant-owned marketplace in the 
short run, covering its costs will be challenging given the small fees it will be able to 
charge. Moreover, since large participant-owned marketplaces  can absorb operating 
losses, provided the owners' net sale or procurement costs remain lower than traditional 
channels, they can likely outlast third-party marketplaces in such a two-way competition. 
Second, while it is technically possible for high buyers and high sellers to have distinct 
Internet marketplaces, this would necessitate doubling the costs of Internet marketplaces 
while simultaneously reducing the liquidity of each in a way that was detrimental to both 
parties. Long-term competition between Internet marketplaces of this type would also 
be unreasonable. Based on this information, the solutions to the marketplace choice 
games can be used to determine the ownership decisions of potential investors. 
Simulation Method and Results 
The key tasks performed to implement the above theory and derive predictions are as 
follows: (a)  create priors and payoff  matrices which are consistent with theoretical 
constraints on payoff relationships, (b)  use the Herings and Peeters (2001) algorithm to 
solve the marketplace choice games, and (c) solve the market entry/ownership games 
which determine equilibrium ownership patterns. In completing the first two parts of 
this process, we solved 768 marketplace choice games. The following paragraphs sum- 
marize the key results. 
Whenever the traditional marketplace competes with the third-party marketplace 
alone, the  two marketplaces are alternatively dominant, depending on whether or not the 
third-party marketplace has a preexisting electronic market (e.g., the case of  Eggs.org). 
While it is assumed the third-party marketplace always costs less to use than the tradi- 
tional marketplace, it is only when the third-party marketplace has some pre-Internet 
experience as a marketplace that it attracts users (e.g., the cases of Eggs.org and the 
various livestock marketplaces). In these latter cases, the equilibrium can be described 
symbolically as (TP,  TP, TP, TP], i.e., the high buyers, medium buyers, high sellers, and 
medium  sellers  all choose  the same third-party  Internet marketplace.  When  the 
traditional marketplace competes with the high buyer-owned marketplace, all other 
buyers and sellers choose the high buyer-owned marketplace instead of the traditional 
marketplace, such that the equilibrium marketplace choice vector in this game is always 
{HB,  HB, HB, HB). Similarly, when the  traditional marketplace competes with the high 
seller-owned marketplace, other buyers and sellers (i.e., high buyers, medium buyers, 
and medium sellers) all choose the high seller-owned marketplace, denoted by {HS,  HS, 
HS, HS).  Finally, in the last bilateral game when the traditional marketplace competes 
with the jointly-owned marketplace (i.e., high buyer and seller-owned), the remaining 
buyers and sellers (i.e., medium buyers and sellers) choose the jointly-owned market- 
place instead of the traditional marketplace, or (JO,  JO, JO, JO).  These results for all 
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The three-way marketplace choice games, while favoring the participant-owned 
marketplaces in most cases, have more diversity of  results. For example, when there is 
three-way competition for users among the traditional marketplace, the third-party 
marketplace, and the high buyer-owned marketplace, the latter of  these tends to be 
chosen by other market participants. However, under the two weighting systems which 
place the greatest weight on  pre-Internet use, the third-party marketplace receives 
critical levels of  use provided  that it has pre-Internet  experience as an electronic 
market, has a lower user cost than the high buyer-owned marketplaces, and certain 
industry structures prevail (i.e., industry structures 3.1,3.3,4.2, or 4.3 from table 1).  In 
none of these industry structures is the buyers' side of the market concentrated,  and the 
high buyer never represents the largest total quantity traded in the market. Industry 
structures 3.1 and 3.3 (table 1)  represent industries where the sellers' side of the market 
is concentrated, while industry structures 4.2 and 4.3 (table 1) are unconcentrated on 
both sides of  the market such that either the medium sellers or medium buyers are 
dominant in terms of total quantity on the market. In summary,  the industry structures 
where the high buyers can provide the least assurance of  liquidity are those where the 
high buyer-owned marketplace may fail to attract all users. 
When considering three-way competition among the traditional marketplace, the 
third-party marketplace, and the high seller-owned marketplace, it is the case that the 
former two marketplaces tend to be unable to attract users under most weighting sys- 
tems and industry structure combinations. Again, under weighting systems placing a 
heavier weight on  preexistence of  electronic markets, the third-party marketplace 
receives a critical level of  participation provided it has previous experience in managing 
electronic markets, has lower costs, and specific industry structures are in place (i.e., for 
industry structures 2.2,2.4,4.2, and 4.3 in table 1).  Industry structures 2.2 and 2.4 are 
comprised of  those industries which are only concentrated on the buyers7  side of  the 
market, while industry structures 4.2 and 4.3 consist of those which are unconcentrated 
on both sides. 
Based on our consideration of  the past two competitive scenarios, we note that the 
third-party marketplace fails under industry structures 1.1  or 1.4. These industries are 
concentrated on both the buyers' side and the sellers' side of  the market. Consequently, 
both a high buyer-owned marketplace and high seller-owned marketplace can assure 
significant  levels of liquidity under such structures, thereby placing third-party market- 
places at a competitive disadvantage. 
For the final game when there is three-way competition among the traditional 
marketplace, the third-party marketplace, and the  jointly-owned marketplace (i.e., high 
buyer and seller-owned),  the third-party marketplace as  well as the traditional market- 
place are always dominated by the participant-owned marketplace. 
Given these findings for the marketplace choice games and the previous discussion 
on the process of  deciding marketplace ownership, the following summary statements 
can be made about the final equilibria and outcomes from the marketplace ownership 
games: 
FINDING  1. Liquidity assurance tends to dominate initial beliefs in the determin- 
ation of  equilibrium marketplace choice and ownership, and will encourage 
convergence toward a single marketplace. Wheatley and Buhr  Afer the Bubble  5 13 
FINDING  2. Participant-owned marketplaces will always dominate even when it is 
not socially optimal (i.e., when costs of  service provision are minimized) because 
participant owners provide greater assurance of liquidity.' 
FINDING  3. A single marketplace owned by the  types of players with fewer members 
but a higher total outputJdemand (i.e., the more concentrated side of the market) 
will tend to survive due to liquidity assurance and lower overall costs. 
FINDING  4. Government intervention to prevent market participants from jointly 
or separately forming Internet marketplaces may yield more efficient  marketplaces 
provided that the costs of setup are lower for the third-party marketplace. 
FINDING  5. When the third-party marketplace has higher setup costs, welfare is 
improved by preventing competition from the third-party marketplace because it 
can act as a spoiler and force non-optimal ownership of  Internet marketplaces by 
a jointly-owned marketplace (JO) or by the higher cost side of the market. 
While these findings recognize that third-party marketplaces can play an important 
role in affecting the survival of  Internet marketplaces, this does not mitigate the fact 
that participant-owned  marketplaces will tend to arise without government  inter- 
vention. In other words, unless beliefs in the use of  the third-party marketplace are 
extremely high, the third-party marketplace will falter when faced with competition 
from participant-owned marketplaces. Furthermore, by  assumption, it is not possible 
for buyers and sellers to be worse off by using an Internet marketplace relative to using 
a traditional marketplace; hence, moving to use Internet marketplaces is Pareto improv- 
ing. However, because some players (medium buyers or sellers) may be better off in a 
separate marketplace from high buyers or sellers, it is possible for there to be "losers" 
when one compares a third-party marketplace with a participant-owned marketplace. 
On net, aggregate efficiency is increased when only one marketplace prevails for a given 
commodity due to the economies of  scale of providing intermediation services. 
Internet Marketplaces 
and the Case of Agriculture 
The focus of  this paper is to develop a conceptual and game theoretic approach for 
analyzing Internet market formation. However, the conceptual results can be compared 
to developments in agricultural Internet markets. For comparison purposes, the current 
state of  Internet marketplaces in agriculture is shown in table 4, which reports the 
number and names of  surviving Internet marketplaces. The information presented is 
derived from an extensive review of  popular press articles, press releases, and 
information collected by other researchers and organizations (i.e., Business.com; the 
One could look at the spate of  demutualizations and proposed demutulaizations among financial and commodity ex- 
changes worldwide since the early 1990s (Agganval, 2002) and then question this finding. The demutualization of these 
exchanges could, in fact, yield efficiency gains and greater managerial flexibility (Hart and Moore,  1996; Steil, 2002). 
However, at this point in time, these exchanges have already achieved the necessary crucial liquidity needed for survival, 
thereby eliminating the initial network advantages of participant ownership.  In  this context, it is possible that some Internet 
marketplaces for agriculture could evolve into independent entities in the future,  but this is most likely to occurafter a critical 
mass is achieved-as  seen in the domain of financial exchanges. Even then, the markets should maintain a close affiliation 
to the key players in their respective commodities. 5 14  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 4. Current Internet Marketplaces in Agriculture 
Number of 
Industry  Marketplaces  Marketplace Name 
Cotton  1  .  TheSeam.com 






Egg Clearinghouse, Inc. (Eggs.org) 
b CargillAgHorizons.com  .  e-AIlM.com  .  Icecorp.com 
b Farmstech.com 
[All marketplaces failed] 
[All marketplaces failed.] 
" It  is hard to categorize the three large buyer-owned websites for grains as e-markets. They integrate the traditional 
marketing  channels ofADM, Cargill, and  Seaboard  (1cecorp.com)  to the Internet. Only 1cecorp.com allowsfor other  buyers 
to use its services. Similarly, Farmstech.com provides private trading platforms for major grain buyers. 
The number of cattle markets is constantly changing. However, producerscattleauctions.com, SuperiorLivestock.com, 
WVMcattle.com, and WinterLivestock.com have been persistent players in  this area. 
'  The swine and producdcitms commodity groups failed, and are now served by proprietary Internet procurement 
systems. 
National Agri-Marketing Association; and Thompson and Nageotte, 2001), as  well as  by 
monitoring developments on the Internet. 
Viable grower-to-agribusiness marketplaces still exist for cotton, dairy, eggs, grains, 
and livestock. Agricultural marketplaces which have failed include those for almonds, 
apples, oranges, pecans, pulses, and tomatoes. We must be careful in interpreting this 
failure to adopt Internet marketplaces as an indication of a lack of adoption of  Internet 
technologies for these commodities. Verticalnet.com, iTradenetwork.com, and GPJX.com 
(Global  Net Exchange) serve these industries by providing software integration services 
and dedicated private Internet procurement systems between buyers and sellers of these 
commodities. Similarly, it must be kept in mind that the game theoretic model applies 
a limited set of factors (ownership, liquidity, and beliefs) in explaining the development 
of Internet marketplaces. Many other factors-such  as insufficient capitalization, poor 
business processes, lack of sufficient technical or management expertise, or even idio- 
syncrasies of bulk agricultural commodities-can and do contribute to outcomes in the 
development of Internet marketplaces. It  is therefore all the  more striking (and perhaps 
beneficial) that we have arrived at our findings through a relatively straightforward 
modeling process without being concerned with such details. 
Evidence on Liquidity and Ownership 
The cotton, dairy, and the grain industries provide illustrations for the first  two findings 
above. In the cases of cotton and dairy, ownership of the marketplaces is on the large 
buyers' sides of these industries. The grain market provides another example of the Wheatley and Buhr  After the Bubble  5 1 5 
importance of  liquidity assurance. Despite being able to influence the early beliefs of 
sellers and smaller buyers in this industry of their value as intermediaries, third-party 
grain sites lacked credibility in their competition with the higher liquidity of  buyer- 
owned marketplaces. 
However, investment in the Internet continues as an enabler of  trade in grain 
markets. Among participant-owned marketplaces, Cargill AgHorizons, e-ADM, and 
Icecorp.com survive as some form of  Internet marketplaces. Cargill AgHorizons and 
e-ADM provide proprietary sites to allow clients to trade directly with them only, and 
Icecorp, supported by  the Seaboard  Corporation, provides for private procurement 
networks. As a result, these three Internet marketplaces represent three buyer-owned 
marketplaces while most others failed. Notably, Farms Technology, LLC, represents a 
unique amalgam in that it is a privately owned company but serves primarily to set up 
buyer and seller trading systems for specific locations. Sellers can use the system only 
if there is a buyer in the area who is also using the trading platform. At present, it has 
two key clients (Jennie-0 Turkey Store and CHS) which use the trading platform to 
procure grain. Consequently, we observe that this firm facilitates grain trading by 
affiliating itself with clients who happen to be  large buyers-again  validating the 
importance of liquidity assurance. 
Eggs.org might be characterized as  third-party and not owned by participants, but its 
history must be considered. The Electronic Clearinghouse, Inc. (owner of Eggs.org) was 
formed through direct government intervention in the late 1960s, with electronic trading 
beginning in 1970 with the closure of cash trading on the Chicago Board of Trade and 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Its role as a third party is somewhat attenuated by the 
fact that large buyers and sellers in the egg industry are on its board of directors. Thus, 
Eggs.org obtains the liquidity assurance of  a participant-owned marketplace due its 
strong affiliation  with buyers and sellers. 
Those Internet marketplaces surviving in the cattle industry also have relationships 
with key players in the livestock business. Furthermore, the three ventures having 
pre-Internet experiences with electronic marketing also have a geographic link: 
WinterLivestock.com (focusing on midwestern markets), producerscattleauctions.com 
(focusing  on the southern states), and WVMcattle.com (focusing  on the  western livestock 
markets). Moutainlivestock.com  appears to be integrated into the  traditional marketing 
channels of the livestock industry, and simply helps to augment its live auctions or sales 
of  various other intermediaries with an online component. Similarly, Superior- 
Livestock.com is deeply entrenched in livestock marketing in the United States at  many 
levels. In all cases, one might take issue with presenting these marketplaces as third 
parties. In particular, Salin (2000) characterizes these Internet companies as being 
among the first-handlers of cattle (i.e., movement from cow-calf to feedlot operations of 
feeder cattle), along with other intermediaries. In short, while these companies 
explicitly would classify themselves as intermediaries, some of them are, in fact, better 
characterized as buyers. 
Before concluding the evidence on the importance of ownership in the survival of  an 
Internet marketplace, brief mention of  AgEx.com's market for almonds offers further 
case observations. Williams (2001) provides various arguments and lessons explaining 
the institutional features leading to the failure of this marketplace; however, what is 
most noteworthy is that of all the players in almond markets, the key firm choosing to 
opt out of the new marketplace was the Blue Diamond Cooperative, one of the world's 5 16  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
largest tree nut and marketing enterprises. That such a large player chose not to parti- 
cipate would have reduced its potential liquidity and, consistent with the game theoretic 
model, may have been a crucial factor in its subsequent failure. 
Evidence on Market Structure and Concentration 
As argued by Finding 3 above (and consistent with findings reported by Lucking-Reilly 
and Spulber, 2001), the more concentrated side of  the market will be the owners of 
Internet marketplaces. For agriculture, the buyers' side of the market is observed to be 
more concentrated, and the majority of Internet marketplaces are owned by buyers for 
those commodities. Specifically, TheSeam.com, Dairy.com, and all of the major grain 
websites are owned by large buyers in their respective ind~stries.~  Of all of these, only 
Eggs.org has direction from large-scale commodity producers. 
Convergence 
In three of the five industries where Internet marketplaces survive, the prediction of 
convergence is validated by the evidence. However, in both the grain and beef indus- 
tries, we see multiple marketplaces. It might be argued that this failure of convergence 
of marketplaces for the cattle and grain industries may well represent just one stage in 
the movement toward a single Internet marketplace. For the cattle industry, one might 
argue that nonconvergence is a result of the unique nature of the livestock business and 
the highly specialized role of cattle companies and order buyers, the regional dispersion 
of the cattle market (especially the cow-calf sector from which feeder cattle originate), 
and the lack of fungibility of feeder cattle due to large variation of quality. However, as 
noted earlier, effective grading and legal structures associated with business processes 
should overcome these issues. In fact, in many web-based markets (e-Bay is a classic 
example), products are often one-of-a-kind or completely nonfungible, and descriptive 
capabilities (similar to grading in agricultural commodity markets) and reputational 
recourse allow for trading. 
What does observed nonconvergence imply for the prediction of convergence in the 
game theoretic model? First, the model does not deal with matters of strategy in imperfect 
competition; however, the separation of  marketplaces could be an effort to avoid direct 
competition  in buying which a single marketplace might provide. Also, the  businesses may 
not have the ability or willingness to share the necessary information in order to allow an 
Internet marketplace to effectively act as a coordination mechanism. This reasoning may 
help to explain why Cargill and ADM, early investors in the  broad-based Internet market- 
places of Rooster.com and Pradium.com, have separate systems currently. Moreover, the 
remaining Internet marketplaces for these businesses are actually just a small extension 
of  their traditional procurement  systems. Consequently,  a joint  market  that fully 
integrated the needs of all large buyers might prove too costly relative to the small gains 
in lowering transaction costs. Finally, these large players may have recognized that a 
Ownership, in accord with our discussion, simply means the firm is an investor in the Internet marketplace. If a firm's 
primary enterprise is to both produce and sell raw agricultural products, then it is a seller. If not, we characterize the firm 
as a buyer. This is an important distinction in the dairy and cotton industries, where owners of Dairy.com include Land 
O'Lakes and some owners of TheSeam.com  are marketingcooperatives. We argue that these cooperatives effectively operate 
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large buyer-owned marketplace on the Internet might not be appealing to producers in 
the context of the grain industry with its long history of producer mistrust of these large 
players and skepticism about the fairness of their dealings. 
Conclusions and Implications 
In this study, we have used a novel game theoretic framework and solution procedure 
to model agribusiness decisions related to the choice and ownership of Internet market- 
places. The analysis illustrates how industry structure, participant beliefs, transaction 
costs, and ownership affect the success of an Internet marketplace. Liquidity is identi- 
fied as the linchpin of  success in that potential participants (both buyers and sellers) 
primarily make their decision to participate based on whether there will be sufficient 
trading in the marketplace. Ultimately, this exercise allows us to conclude that Internet 
marketplaces which were owned by large or major buyers and sellers would have the 
greatest chance of  success given their ability to create liquidity by their own partici- 
pation. We are further able to highlight other subsidiary nuances in the strategic 
environment of marketplace survival as  well as the efficiency of various outcomes. 
While it is very difficult to generate testable hypotheses related to market formation, 
this paper also provides observations on the development of Internet marketplaces in 
agriculture to tie observed market formation with the results of  the game theoretic 
simulations of  behavior. By nature, this must be done carefully because there are 
numerous real-world frictions that can potentially create results far different from 
model representations. For example, realities such as  tax codes and trading regulations, 
or even the nature of the commodities and business operations in existence, may create 
barriers that prevent success of a potential Internet marketplace. However, the model 
allows us  to better understand the broader undercurrents observed-the  failure of third- 
party marketplaces, the sponsorship of marketplaces by industry participants, and the 
ownership of the marketplaces by the more concentrated side of the market. 
The strongest result emerging is  that  large participants in primary commodity sectors 
did well to consider sponsoring Internet marketplaces given their relatively high proba- 
bility of  success. At the same time, it tells third-party marketplace entrepreneurs and 
investors that the barriers to entry would be too great for them to survive unless they 
had some sort of government sponsorship andlor a high degree of support or contractual 
relationships with buyers and sellers in a market. Most such third-party players learned 
these lessons quickly, thereby explaining the rapid movement of e-Markets.com, 
eCotton.com, Farms.com, and many others into the business of  software services and 
system integration for the agricultural sector. 
A more tenuous observation is related to the convergence of  marketplaces. While 
several commodities have converged to a single Internet trading platform, others such 
as grain and livestock have multiple Internet marketplaces. Reasons for lack of 
convergence could include the regionality of  production or markets, differences in the 
characteristics of  the commodity, and extreme rivalry and lack of  cooperation, among 
others, which are not captured in the model. 
Notably, the issue of size in this exercise is a construct to model liquidity assurance; 
however, in the absence of  size of  ownership, an alternative to creating a successful 
marketplace requires some other guarantee of very high probabilities of large volumes 
of participants. It  is also important to recognize that the model does not directly address 5 1 8  December 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
issues of imperfect competition and the persistent mistrust which smaller participants 
may perceive in the motives of large-scale trader/owners. As such, we do not directly 
confront the concerns expressed by legislators and policy makers regarding participant 
alliances in the formation of marketplaces (e.g., Rooster.com, which was a consortium 
including ADM and Cargill). Nevertheless, the model presented provides a clear 
economic explanation of why, irrespective of  market power matters, the large players 
in agricultural markets would consider investing in such marketplaces. 
The Internet has not resulted in a dramatic change in the marketing structures in 
agriculture. That being said, it represents an important future marketing channel for 
agriculture. Consequently, this paper has examined the factors affecting Internet 
marketplace choice and ownership. In doing so, it has shown how game theoretic and 
network considerations provide for a clearer view and analysis of  the events which 
unfolded in this environment without the clouding hype that  was so prevalent just a few 
years ago. 
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